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Fifty years ago, the Second Circuit decided perhaps the most important
case under the U.S. securities laws – Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur. This decision focused on several landmark issues,
including insider trading, company disclosure obligations, and the concept
of materiality. Although a number of its rulings subsequently were rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court, others remain good law today. Indeed, the
significance of Texas Gulf Sulphur’s analysis in large measure is evidenced
by its continued vitality in the federal courts and SEC enforcement prac-
tice. From a comparative law perspective, Texas Gulf Sulphur also is an
important decision. Many of the principles enunciated in that decision to-
day have been adopted by developed securities markets outside of the
United States.
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Decided fifty years ago, Securities and Exchange Commission v.Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. (hereinafter referred to as Texas GulfSulphur or TGS)1 constitutes one of the preeminent federal se-
curities law decisions. Its significance remains vibrant today, impacting
fundamental principles underlying the securities laws.2 Indeed, a sound
assertion may be proffered that TGS justifiably may be viewed as the
most important federal securities law decision handed down to date.3
To commemorate the 50th Anniversary of this seminal decision,4 the
SMU Law Review is honored to publish this Symposium Issue. The con-
tributions in this Issue are authored by premier securities law academi-
cians in this country. The participation of these outstanding academicians
in this Symposium Issue reflects both the continued importance of Texas
Gulf Sulphur and its ramifications. With its long tradition of excellence in
the business associations and securities law fields, as reflected by the
scholarship of Professor Alan R. Bromberg,5 the SMU Law Review is a
superb forum to host this commemorative publication.
1. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc).
2. For example, these principles, discussed in this article, include those implicating
insider trading, materiality, scienter, and affirmative disclosure.
3. Unquestionably, there have been several important U.S. Supreme Court decisions
in the federal securities law area. As a generality, these decisions focused on a specific
issue that had significant impact. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134
S.Ct. 2398 (2014) (reaffirming the continued validity of the fraud-on-the-market theory for
§ 10(b) class actions); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (holding that
in a private action, § 10(b) reaches only securities listed on a U.S. exchange and other
purchases or sales made in the United States); Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding no aiding and abetting liability in private
§ 10(b) actions); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that § 10(b)
does not reach breach of fiduciary conduct absent deception or manipulation); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that in a private § 10(b) action,
a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of the subject securities in connection with the
alleged misconduct in order to have standing to bring suit for damages); SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (interpreting the term investment contract in a flexible
manner to bring the subject transaction within the scope of the federal securities laws).
4. An excellent article commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Texas Gulf Sulphur
has been authored by Professor Alan M. Weinberger. See generally Alan M. Weinberger,
Forever Young: Texas Gulf Sulphur Rules at Fifty, 45 SEC. REG. L. J. 23 (Spring 2017).
5. Joining the SMU Law School faculty in 1956, Professor Alan Bromberg was a
member of our faculty for well over 50 years. His seminal treatises include: SECURITIES
LAW FRAUD: RULE 10B-5 (1967); BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD (2d
ed. 2012) (coauthored with Lewis D. Lowenfels and Michael J. Sullivan); CRANE AND
BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP (1968) (coauthored with Professor Judson A. Crane); and
BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP LAW (2d ed. 2017) (coauthored with Professor
Larry E. Ribstein). Note that the Second Circuit’s opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur cited
Professor Bromberg’s Rule 10b-5 treatise. See 401 F.2d at 859.
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I. KEY ISSUES ADDRESSED BY TEXAS GULF SULPHUR
Texas Gulf Sulphur’s focus on insider trading may well be the foremost
subject that has generated attention throughout the decades. By applying
the Securities Exchange Act’s broad antifraud statute—§ 10(b)6 (and
SEC Rule 10b-57 promulgated thereunder)—to insider trading that oc-
curred on stock exchanges,8 TGS federalized the proscription against im-
proper insider trading.9 This aspect of TGS, which continues to have
domestic as well as international impact, is discussed later in this article.10
Significantly, TGS addressed several other key principles. These princi-
ples include, for example: materiality, issuer liability exposure for mis-
leading disclosure, requisite mental culpability, and the timing of insider
trades. While a number of the case’s holdings are no longer good law in
this country, others remain applicable not only in the United States but
have also been embraced by other countries.11
A. MATERIALITY
As discussed later in this article, TGS’s adoption of the access principle
or parity of information principle prevails today in countries that have
developed securities markets.12 With respect to the concept of material-
ity, relying on the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Torts,13 the
Second Circuit focused on whether a reasonable person would attach im-
portance to the information misstated or omitted in making an invest-
ment decision with respect to the subject transaction.14 Applying this
In 2015, the SMU Law Review published a Symposium Issue in honor of Professor
Bromberg. The contributors to that Issue are the foremost academicians in the business
associations and securities law fields in this country. See Symposium, Tributes to Professor
Alan R. Bromberg, 68 SMU L. REV. 595 (2015).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
7. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2017).
8. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 847–57. See id. at 847–48 (citing
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461–62 (2d Cir. 1965); Cochran v. Channing Corp.,
211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); 3 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1455–56
(2d ed. 1961)) (stating that, pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act, Congress “purposed
to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions
generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges” and that
“[t]he Act and the Rule apply to the transactions here, all of which were consummated on
exchanges”).
9. See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
115–33 (Oxford Univ. Press 2018).
10. See infra notes 62–85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 23, 55, 81–85 and accompanying text. Of course, that other coun-
tries have adopted a number of TGS’s holdings does not necessarily signify that these
countries explicitly focused on that decision and determined to embrace its principles.
Nonetheless, such international approval supports the merit of the court’s holdings.
12. Note that the access principle and parity of information principle are two different
principles. Interpreting Texas Gulf Sulphur’s language, each principle received the court’s
approbation. See 401 F.2d at 848. See also discussion infra notes 70–72 and accompanying
text.
13. 401 F.2d at 849, (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (Am. Law
Inst. 1938)).
14. See 401 F.2d at 849.
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standard, the court utilized the probability/magnitude test, stating:
“whether facts are material within Rule 10b-5 when the facts relate to a
particular event and are undisclosed by those persons who are knowl-
edgeable thereof will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both
the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.”15
Hence, pursuant to this standard, a contingent event of high magnitude
may be material even if its likelihood of occurrence is relatively remote.16
This standard has been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the con-
texts of alleged deficient disclosure with respect to merger negotiations17
and adverse drug reports.18
Nonetheless, more expansive language in TGS relating to materiality
was subsequently rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. In this regard, the
TGS court referenced a fact as being material if it might reasonably affect
the value of the subject company’s securities.19 Less than a decade later,
the U.S. Supreme Court adhered to the “would” standard, concluding
that the “might” standard was “too suggestive of mere possibility.”20
Hence, today, the applicable inquiry examines whether a substantial like-
lihood exists that adequate disclosure of the misstated or omitted infor-
mation would have been perceived by a reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the total mix of information that was made
available.21
15. Id. (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965)).
16. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Geon
Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1976)) (“Since a merger in which it is bought
out is the most important event that can occur in a small corporation’s life, to wit, its death,
we think that inside[r] information, as regards a merger of this sort, can become material at
an earlier stage than would be the case as regards lesser transactions—and this even
though the mortality rate of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high.”).
17. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 238–39. Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Basic
addressed the materiality of the allegedly misstated information in a situation where the
issuer elected to speak. The decision neither addressed the timing of disclosure nor a sub-
ject issuer’s duty to disclose. See id. at 235 (stating that “this case does not concern the
timing of a disclosure; it concerns only its accuracy and completeness”) (emphasis added).
For further discussion, see MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES
AND REMEDIES § 2.03[5] (2017).
18. See generally Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011) (holding
that the number of adverse drug reports received by a subject company need not reach the
level of being statistically significant in order for such information to be deemed material
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act).
19. See 401 F.2d at 849 (quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d at 462; Kohler v.
Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963)) (stating that the test of materiality “encom-
passes any fact ‘which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of
the corporation’s stock or securities.’”). See also Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 850
(“might have affected the price of the stock”).
20. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (quoting Gerstle v.
Gamble–Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.)). Although this
case involved materiality under Section 14(a) and SEC Rule 14a-9 with respect to the ade-
quacy of disclosure in the proxy statement context, the rationale has been applied in cases
implicating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See cases cited supra notes 17–18.
21. See TSC Industries, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449 (holding that “[t]his standard . . . does not
require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have
caused the reasonable investor to change his vote [and that] [w]hat the standard does con-
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B. PRICE IMPACT
Interestingly, with respect to ascertaining the materiality of the subject
information, the Second Circuit in TGS focused on whether adequate dis-
closure of such information may be “reasonably certain to have a sub-
stantial effect on the market price of the security.”22 This correlation
between price impact and materiality is contained in the securities laws of
developed countries.23 In this country, however, price impact frequently
is not invoked when ascertaining the materiality of the subject informa-
tion.24 That is not to suggest that price impact is not an important crite-
rion with respect to other elements of a securities cause of action. Indeed,
price impact is a necessary condition for a class action based on an al-
leged violation of §10(b).25 In this regard, to rebut the presumption of
reliance in a § 10(b) action based on the premise that the subject securi-
ties traded in an efficient market,26 a defendant can establish that the
alleged misstatements did not in actuality affect the subject security’s
market price.27 Similarly, proving that a defendant corporation’s correc-
tive disclosure negatively impacted the price of the subject security, is
template is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omit-
ted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder”).
22. 401 F.2d at 848 (citing Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate In-
formation Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L.
REV. 1271, 1289 (1965)).
23. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 April 2014 on Market Abuse Regulation, art. 7, para. 1(a), O.J. (L 173) 1
(defining inside information to encompass “information of a precise nature, which has not
been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or more
financial instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a signifi-
cant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative
financial instruments”); Corporations Act 2001, (Cth) §§ 1042C, 1042D, 1043A (Austl.) (fo-
cusing on whether the information, if it were generally available, would have a material
effect on the price or value of the subject securities); Province of Ontario Securities Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, §§ 1(1), 126.2(1)(b) (setting forth that information is material if it
“would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of
the securities.”).
24. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 16–21 and accompanying textual discussion. But
see Christine Asia Co. v. Ma, No. 16-2519-CV, 2017 WL 6003340, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 5,
2017) (“The importance of this information to investors is illustrated by the fact that, when
[the allegedly concealed information] was revealed four months subsequent to the IPO,
Alibaba’s stock dropped 13% in two days, erasing $33 billion in market capitalization.”).
25. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2414 (2014) (“In
the absence of price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and presumption of reli-
ance collapse.”).
26. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Halliburton, “to invoke the Basic pre-
sumption, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the alleged misrepresentations were publicly
known, (2) they were material, (3) the stock traded in an efficient market, and (4) the
plaintiff traded the stock between when the misrepresentations were made and when the
truth was revealed.” 134 S.Ct. at 2413 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248
(1988)).
27. See Halliburton, 134 S.Ct. at 2417 (holding that defendants “must be afforded an
opportunity before class certification to defeat the presumption through evidence that an
alleged misrepresentation did not actually affect the market price of the stock.”). See also
Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 99 (2d Cir. 2017) (concluding that “defendants
must rebut the Basic presumption by disproving reliance by a preponderance of the evi-
dence at the class certification stage.”).
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employed by plaintiffs to show loss causation.28 Accordingly, price impact
is a key issue in U.S. securities litigation. Nonetheless, departing from the
approach espoused in TGS and adopted by other countries, price impact
ordinarily is not a principal inquiry under the U.S. securities laws when
assessing the materiality of the alleged disclosure deficiency.29
C. TIMING OF INSIDERS’ TRADES
Related to the holding that the results of the TGS discovery hole were
material30 was the inquiry of when insiders and others subject to the in-
sider trading prohibition legally could purchase TGS securities. Depart-
ing from the district court’s holding that the company’s announcement of
the information was the point in time after which insiders could legally
trade,31 the Second Circuit held that insider activity must await not only
the formal announcement but also the adequate dissemination of such
information.32 In this instance, dissemination of the announcement by
TGS over the media of widest circulation—at that time, the Dow Jones
broad tape—was required to be effected before insiders could have per-
missibly traded.33 In an accompanying footnote, the court elaborated
that, when the subject information is not readily translatable, a reasona-
ble waiting period may be required to enable investors to absorb and
evaluate such information.34 This position’s soundness remains applicable
28. See, e.g., Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (noting
“the complaint’s failure to claim that Dura’s share price fell significantly after the truth
became known”); Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 830 F.3d
376, 384–85 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that loss causation can be shown by means of a correc-
tive disclosure when “the market reacted negatively to a corrective disclosure of fraud.”
(quoting In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511 (2d Cir. 2010)).
29. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 16–21 and accompanying textual discussion. See
also Council Regulation 596/2014, supra note 23, at art. 7, para. 4 (providing that “informa-
tion which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices
of financial instruments . . . shall mean information a reasonable investor would be likely to
use as part of the basis of his or her investment decisions”).
30. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)
(“Our survey of the facts found below conclusively establishes that knowledge of the re-
sults of the discovery hole, K-55-1, would have been important to a reasonable investor
and might have affected the price of the stock.”).
31. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 288–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d
and rev’d, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). The district court reasoned that, if a
waiting period after a material corporate announcement is to be required, that determina-
tion should be made by the SEC pursuant to its rulemaking authority or by Congress. See
id. at 289.
32. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 853–54.
33. See id. at 854 (“Assuming that the contents of the [TGS] official release could
instantaneously be acted upon, at the minimum [the insider] should have waited until the
news could reasonably have been expected to appear over the media of widest circulation,
the Dow Jones broad tape, rather than hastening to insure an advantage to himself . . . .”).
34. See id. at 854 n.18 (Explaining that although the issue was not before the court and
therefore did “not discuss the necessity of considering the advisability of a ‘reasonable
waiting period’ during which outsiders may absorb and evaluate disclosures, [the court]
note[d] in passing that, where the news is of a sort which is not readily translatable into
investment action, insiders may not take advantage of their advance opportunity to evalu-
ate the information by acting immediately upon dissemination.”). In that footnote, the
Second Circuit called for the SEC pursuant to its rulemaking power to provide “some
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today, as evidenced by customary corporate insider trading policies that
mandate a specified waiting period after the issuance of a quarterly earn-
ings announcement,35 as well as the pre-clearance of trades by Section 16
insiders (and members of their immediate families),36 even if the contem-
plated transactions are to occur outside of a black-out period.37
D. COMPANY LIABILITY FOR MISLEADING DISCLOSURE IN THE
SECONDARY TRADING MARKETS
With respect to an alleged materially false press release issued by Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the question was posed as to whether the company could
be held liable under § 10(b) if it was not engaged in related securities
transactions or had not acted with wrongful intent.38 Disagreeing with the
narrow construction adopted by the district court,39 the Second Circuit
interpreted the statute’s “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security” language in a more flexible manner. Holding that a corporation
may be subject to § 10(b) liability when it disseminates materially mis-
leading information “in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the
investing public”40 and that such liability may be premised on negli-
gence,41 the court greatly expanded a corporation’s exposure in the sec-
predictability of certainty for the business community.” Id. The Commission, however, has
declined to alleviate this dilemma.
35. See MARC I. STEINBERG & WILLIAM K.S. WANG, INSIDER TRADING 807 n.3 (3d
ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (referencing the use by publicly-held companies of trading
windows permitting trades by insiders, depending on the subject company’s policy, of three
to twelve trading days subsequent to a quarterly earnings announcement).
36. Section 16 insiders include a subject company’s directors, officers, and sharehold-
ers who beneficially own more than ten percent of a class of a subject issuer’s equity securi-
ties. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)–(b) (2012). Pursuant to SEC rule, in determining whether a
person is an officer, the key inquiry is whether such person performs significant policy-
making functions (rather than being based on such person’s title alone). See Rule 16a-1(f),
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2017). See generally Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Lansdale, Jr.,
The Judicial and Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33 (1992).
37. See, e.g., Insider Trading and Confidentiality Policy, NEWS CORP., at p. 5 (June
2016), https://newscorp.com/corporate-governance/insider-trading-and-confidentiality-poli
cy/ [https://perma.cc/8SQY-5ED8] (“If a Section 16 Reporting Person, Designated Individ-
ual or member of such person’s immediate family or household is contemplating a transac-
tion in the Company’s securities, the proposed transaction must be pre-cleared with either
the News Corporation General Counsel or his or her designee, even if the proposed trans-
action is to take place outside of the Black-Out Period.”). Today, insiders may legally sell
their securities pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 plans, provided that the requirements of the rule
are satisfied. See Rule 10b5-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (2017). The rule has been met
with criticism. See, e.g., Allan Horwich, The Legality of Opportunistically Timing Public
Company Disclosures in the Context of SEC Rule 10b5-1, 71 BUS. LAW. 1113 (2016).
38. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 857–64.
39. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d
and rev’d, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (stating that “the issuance of a false and
misleading press release may constitute a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 if its purpose
is to affect the market price of a company’s stock to the advantage of the company or its
insiders”).
40. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 862.
41. See id. at 862–63 (holding that a violation of § 10(b) based on a company’s materi-
ally misleading statement would be appropriate if such statement was the result of a lack of
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ondary trading markets.42
Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected negligence as the requisite
culpability level in § 10(b) actions, holding instead that intentional or
knowing misconduct must be shown.43 Nonetheless, the negligent dissem-
ination of information to the securities markets by companies today may
be addressed under other provisions by the SEC44 and, to some extent, by
private claimants.45 More importantly, the “reasonably calculated to in-
fluence the investing public” standard enunciated in Texas Gulf Sulphur
remains pertinent today when assessing a company’s liability exposure in
its dissemination of alleged materially misleading information.46
E. COMPANY AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
Although not directly addressing the topic, language in Texas Gulf
Sulphur may be interpreted to favor the implementation of affirmative
disclosure obligations upon publicly-traded corporations. As stated by the
court: “We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immedi-
ately; the timing of disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the
corporate officers entrusted with the management of the corporation
within the affirmative disclosure requirements promulgated by the ex-
changes and by the SEC. . . .”47 While the national securities exchanges
today, absent the presence of a valid business reason, require a listed
company to timely disclose material information,48 the SEC lags behind.
due diligence). In this regard, the TGS court also applied a negligence standard when de-
termining the liability of the individual defendants. See id. at 854–56.
42. In his concurring opinion, Judge Friendly expressed his concern with the applica-
tion of a negligence standard: “The consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting
of a press release . . . may impose civil liability on the corporation are frightening.” Id. at
866 (Friendly, J., concurring). See David S. Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur—The Second
Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 NW. U.L. REV.
423 (1968).
43. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690–94 (1980) (holding that the SEC must prove
scienter in its enforcement actions alleging violation of § 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding that scienter must be proven in private ac-
tions for damages alleging violation of § 10(b)).
44. For example, the SEC may seek recovery based on negligent violation of such
provisions as Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
77q(a)(2)–(a)(3) (2012), and Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C.
78m(a) (2012).
45. With respect to material misrepresentations contained in a proxy statement, pri-
vate claimants may seek relief against the company and its insiders based on negligence
pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), and SEC
Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, promulgated thereunder. See, e.g., Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v. Gamble–Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. See Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of Two
Duties, 71 SMU L. REV. (2018) (stating that “the ‘reasonably calculated’ standard survived
and flourished” and that cases subsequent to TGS have “insist[ed] only that reliance by
investors be foreseeable given the medium of dissemination that was chosen”).
47. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
48. See, e.g., New York Stock Exch. (NYSE), Listed Company Manual §§ 202.01–.06,
http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selected
node=chp_1_3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/
HEW3-7TFW] (last accessed Feb. 23, 2018); Nasdaq Listing Rules, Disclosure of Material
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Indeed, it was not until the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of
200249 that Congress mandated that the Commission adopt “a rapid and
current” reporting regime regarding material changes in a subject com-
pany’s financial condition or operations.50 Prior to that time, except for
certain clearly fundamental matters,51 the SEC declined to require that
Exchange Act reporting companies disclose current material information
during the time interval between the filing of their periodic reports.52
Over a year after receiving this mandate from Congress, the Commission
amended Form 8-K to provide for the current reporting by subject com-
panies of a far greater number of events.53 Nonetheless, key deficiencies
remain, such as the SEC’s failure to require a subject company to disclose
the loss of a major contract until such company’s next quarterly report—
even if no valid business purpose exists for justifying such delay.54 The
SEC’s approach departs from that of other developed securities markets
Information, Rule IM-5250(b)(1) http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/ [https://
perma.cc/R45B-RF84] (last accessed Feb. 23, 2018). For example, given certain exceptions,
§ 202.05 of the NYSE Manual (Timely Disclosure of Material News Developments) pro-
vides in part: “A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or
information which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its
securities. . . .” Likewise, Nasdaq Listing Rule IM-5250(b)(1) requires, with certain excep-
tions, that “Nasdaq Companies disclose promptly to the public through any Regulation FD
compliant method (or combination of methods) of disclosure any material information that
would reasonably be expected to affect the value of their securities or influence investors’
decisions.” While the self-regulatory organizations may initiate an enforcement action
against a subject company for violation of SRO rules, no private right of action exists for
allegedly aggrieved investors based on violation of such rules. See, e.g., Harris v. TD Amer-
itrade, Inc., 805 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 2015); Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th
Cir. 1980).
49. See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745.
50. See id. § 409 (requiring that “[e]ach issuer reporting under Section 13(a) and 15(d)
[of the Securities Exchange Act] shall disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis
such additional information concerning material changes in the financial condition or oper-
ations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative information
and graphic presentations, as the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful
for the protection of investors and in the public interest”).
51. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2017) (Form 8-K prior to the 2004 SEC amendments).
Only the following items were mandatory under Form 8-K prior to the 2004 amendments:
changes in control of registrant (item 1), acquisition or disposition of assets (item 2), bank-
ruptcy or receivership (item 3), changes in registrant’s certifying accountant (item 4), and
resignations of registrant’s directors (item 6).
52. Of course, provided a duty to correct or a duty to update disclosures previously
made arose, then the company was required to make the requisite disclosure. See, e.g.,
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 n. 41 (5th Cir. 1994); Backman v. Polaroid Corp.,
910 F.2d 10, 16–17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc). See also Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading,
Selective Disclosure, and Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 635, 657–58 (2001) (stating at that time that generally “U.S. law does not require
companies to disclose material nonpublic information during the interval between the fil-
ing of periodic reports with the SEC”).
53. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing
Date, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49424, 69 Fed. Reg. 58 (Mar. 25, 2004); 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.308 (2017).
54. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-49424 (reasoning that requiring a company to
make such disclosure would present difficulties in ascertaining when the contract was in
fact terminated and could give rise to customers engaging in negotiation ploys). But see
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 857 (7th ed. 2017) (asserting that because
“the irretrievable loss of a major contract presumptively is material to investors . . . inves-
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that require, absent meritorious business reason, the prompt disclosure
by a subject company of material information to investors and the securi-
ties markets.55
F. TGS—FAR MORE THAN AN INSIDER TRADING CASE
The foregoing discussion highlights that Texas Gulf Sulphur is far more
than an insider trading case. Coverage of such a large number of key
subjects, particularly when several of these subjects were in their infancy,
is rare in a single legal opinion. Addressing such fundamental concepts as
materiality, the “in connection with” requirement of § 10(b), a company’s
liability exposure for disseminating materially false information in the
secondary trading markets, the timing of an insider’s securities trades,
and the mental culpability standard, TGS has made an impressive contri-
bution to the development of the securities laws. While some of the deci-
sion’s holdings are no longer good law, others have endured and
flourished. Nonetheless, the legacy of TGS is largely based on its analysis
of § 10(b)’s insider trading prohibition.
II. THE FEDERALIZATION OF INSIDER TRADING
A. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT—SECTION 16
Implicating the duties of care and loyalty, improper insider trading by
corporate fiduciaries seemingly would comprise a fundamental compo-
nent of state corporation law.56 Yet, the states largely declined to address
this practice, particularly in the impersonal stock market insider trading
context.57 Federal law has filled this void. Indeed, to some extent, Con-
gress did so with the enactment of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
tors ought to be promptly provided with this information in order to assess whether to
purchase, hold, or sell the subject securities”).
55. See Steinberg, supra note 52, at 670 (stating that, in other developed securities
markets, “absent sufficient business justification, publicly-held issuers on a continuous ba-
sis must promptly and timely disclose material matters to the securities marketplace”). For
examples of such jurisdictions, see, e.g., Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) S 674(2) (Austl.);
Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S. 5, § 75 (Can.); Council Regulation
(EU) No. 596/2014, supra note 23, at art. 17. For example, pursuant to Regulation No. 596/
2014, at Article 17, Paragraph 4, the subject company, in addition to having justifiable
reason for delaying disclosure, must also show that such delay likely will not mislead the
public and that the confidentiality of the specified information will be maintained.
Note that Canada has no federal securities law. Rather, each of that nation’s provinces
and territories regulate its subject securities markets. Because the Ontario securities laws
are viewed as the most significant in Canada, they are discussed where appropriate in this
article.
56. See, e.g., Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831 (Del. 2011); Dia-
mond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
57. See, e.g., Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana law);
Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Schaack, 867 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1994); Schein v. Chasen,
313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975). See also MARC I. STEINBERG & WILLIAM K.S. WANG, INSIDER
TRADING 1023–60 (3d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2010) (and cases discussed therein).
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Act of 1934, which calls for insiders58 to disgorge their profits made from
purchases and sales or sales and purchases of equity securities within a
six-month period.59 Additionally, Section 16 prohibits these individuals
from entering into short-sale transactions in their company’s equity secur-
ities.60 Going beyond disclosure and directly regulating corporate fiduci-
ary conduct, Section 16 is significant as it illustrates Congress’s
receptiveness, dating back to 1934, to federalize a key aspect of corporate
governance that was perceived to be within the sole realm of state com-
pany law.61
B. THE SEC SPEAKS—IN RE CADY, ROBERTS
Nonetheless, Section 16 is limited in its scope. A more far-reaching fed-
eral prohibition against insider trading was perceived as necessary by
then SEC Chairman William Cary. On his agenda when he assumed the
SEC Chairmanship in 1961 was for the Commission to pro-actively rem-
edy the state law permissiveness regarding open-market insider trading
by corporate fiduciaries.62 The opportunity to do so arose in an adminis-
trative proceeding, In re Cady, Roberts & Company.63 In a decision au-
thored by Chairman Cary, the Commission held that the exchange-based
insider trading that transpired was violative of the federal securities
58. Under Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012), insiders include a subject company’s
directors, officers, and shareholders who beneficially own more than ten percent of a class
of a subject issuer’s equity securities. See note 36 supra.
59. See Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012). The subject corporation or share-
holder bringing suit on such corporation’s behalf may recover irrespective of the insider’s
exercise of due diligence. Thus, an insider who engages in such transactions thus is held
strictly liable and must disgorge his or her profits. See, e.g., Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975); Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970). Note that
Section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), requires these insiders to file reports with the SEC and
with the applicable stock exchange reporting their stockholdings and transactions in the
subject securities.
60. Section 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2012). Generally, short-selling may be defined as
“the sale of a security that the seller does not own or that the seller owns but does not
deliver.” Ralph Janvey, Short Selling, 20 SEC. REG. L.J. 270, 271 (1992). For superb trea-
tises examining Section 16, see ARNOLD S. JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES EX-
CHANGE ACT (2017); PETER J. ROMEO & ALAN L. DYE, SECTION 16 TREATISE AND
REPORTING GUIDE, https://www.section16treatise.net/home/ [https://perma.cc/36EL-RK
DP] (last accessed Feb. 23, 2018).
61. As Section 16(b)’s language makes clear, the provision’s objective is “preventing
the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 119 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2018).
62. As Chairman Cary asserted, it is “shocking for business executives to personally
profit from their inside information about the corporations they managed [and] that those
actions were likely to reduce public confidence . . . in the markets.” Fair to All People: The
SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, The SEC Takes Command, In the Matter of
Cady, Roberts & Company, SEC HISTORICAL SOCIETY (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.sechis
torical.org/museum/galleries/it/takeCommand_b.php [https://perma.cc/QMH6-5CMN]. See
Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319 (1999) (citing Joel Seligman, THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF WALL STREET 344–45 (2d ed. 1995)).
63. See generally 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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laws.64 The importance of the proceeding was eminently clear to the
Commission, as its opinion begins by reflecting: “This is a case of first
impression and one of signal importance in our administration of the Fed-
eral securities acts.”65 Applying the “access” theory, the SEC held that
“insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue
of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal
and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.”66 Hence,
by holding that the exchange-based trading that was transacted consti-
tuted securities fraud, the Commission sought to federalize the law of
insider trading.67
Being an administrative decision, uncertainty existed regarding the
precedential value or impact of Cady, Roberts. Neither the language of
§ 10(b) nor any other provision of the federal securities laws mandated
that a broad insider trading prohibition be recognized.68 Approbation by
an esteemed court was essential to provide adequate certainty to the
SEC’s position. Hence, the importance of Texas Gulf Sulphur becomes
clear.
64. See id. at 907–17. The Commission found that the defendants violated Section
17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012), and Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
65. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907.
66. Id. at 911. According to the Commission: “[T]he obligation rests on two principal
elements: first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advan-
tage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” Id. at
912 (citing 3 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1450–51 (2d ed. 1961)).
67. See STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 121. See also Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 n. 15
(stating that “[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the
use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate
office”).
In Cady, Roberts, the Commission asserted that “the securities acts may be said to have
generated a wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation law.” Id. at 910. For
support, the SEC quoted from a federal appellate decision containing expansive language.
As stated by the Third Circuit in McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961):
In the present case we are construing two Sections [10, 29] of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. That Act deals with the protection of investors, pri-
marily stockholders. It creates many managerial duties and liabilities un-
known to the common law. It expresses federal interest in management-
stockholder relationships which theretofore had been almost exclusively the
concern of the states. Section 10(b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on man-
agement vis-a-vis the corporation and its individual stockholders. As imple-
mented by Rule 10b-5 and Section 29(b), Section 10(b) provides
stockholders with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary duties.
It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act, of which Sections 10(b) and 29(b)
are parts, constitutes far reaching federal substantive corporation law.
Id. at 834 (quoted in Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 910 n. 10).
68. See STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 122; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Equal Access to
Information: The Fraud at the Heart of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. (2018); Ste-
phen M. Bainbridge, Who Was the First Person the SEC Found to Have Violated the Insider
Trading Laws?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.professorbain
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/who-was-the-first-person-the-sec-found-to-
have-violated-the-insider-trading-laws.html [https://perma.cc/4RTG-AJT9].
2018] Texas Gulf at Fifty 637
C. TGS—ADOPTION OF A BROAD INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION
The Second Circuit’s decision in TGS made eminently clear that an
expansive federal insider trading prohibition was applicable in the imper-
sonal securities market setting.69 Adopting the SEC’s position, the Sec-
ond Circuit in TGS prescribed a broad “disclose or abstain” mandate.
Interestingly, the decision’s language leaves some uncertainty which stan-
dard the court in fact adopted: the parity of information standard, or the
equal access test. Indeed, these two standards are enunciated in the same
paragraph of the court’s opinion. Advancing an expansive parity-of-infor-
mation standard, the TGS court stated:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing
it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do
so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such information remains undisclosed.70
On the other hand, earlier in that same paragraph, quoting approvingly
from the SEC’s decision in Cady, Roberts, the TGS court set forth the
access standard.71 Subsequent Second Circuit decisions clarified that the
access standard prevailed, stating: “Anyone corporate insider or not who
regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use this infor-
mation to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to
disclose.”72
D. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Nonetheless, twelve years after TGS, the Supreme Court rejected both
the parity of information and access standards, premising insider trading
liability under § 10(b) on an insider’s or other subject person’s breach of
fiduciary duty or relationship of trust and confidence.73 Although the in-
69. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847–57 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc);
STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 122. Note that a few years earlier, the Second Circuit applied
the disclose-or-abstain obligation under § 10(b) in the context of face-to-face securities
transactions. See List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461–62 (2d Cir. 1965). See gener-
ally William H. Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal
Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM L. REV. 1361 (1965).
70. 401 F.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
71. The Second Circuit stated that the disclose-or-abstain rule:
[I]s based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities market-
place that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information. . . . The essence of the Rule is that anyone
who, trading for his own account in the securities of a corporation, has “ac-
cess, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone” may not take
“advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing,” i.[e]., the investing public.
Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912).
72. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (emphasis added).
73. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 222–23, 230 (1980) (holding that si-
lence may incur § 10(b) liability where a duty to disclose exists arising from a fiduciary
relationship or a relationship of trust and confidence). Accord Salman v. United States, 137
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sider trading prohibition thus has been narrowed by the U.S. Supreme
Court as compared to the standards set forth in TGS, the federalization
of this prohibition today is firmly established. Hence, it should not be
minimized that the proscription against insider trading has been recog-
nized by the U.S. Supreme Court as coming within the purview of the
federal securities laws and, more particularly, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Al-
though critics may be dismayed regarding the High Court’s restrictive ap-
proach,74 it should be kept in focus that federal, rather than state, law
reigns supreme in this setting, and that this outcome in good measure is
due to the Second Circuit’s decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur.75
E. CONTINUED VALIDITY OF PARITY AND ACCESS STANDARDS
With frequency, it is posited that the parity of information and access
standards no longer survive. Such an assertion is misplaced. Certainly,
these standards no longer apply with respect to insider trading liability
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. But what at times is overlooked is that, in
promulgating Rule 14e-376 which governs insider trading in the tender
offer context,77 the SEC adopted the parity of information standard.78
Limited to the tender offer setting, this rule contains no breach of fiduci-
S.Ct. 420 (2016) (premising tipper-tippee liability on a tipper’s conveyance of material non-
public information to the recipient as a gift, thereby breaching the tipper’s fiduciary duty to
his employer and his employer’s clients and that the tippee knew of such breach); United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (adopting the misappropriation theory and holding
that § 10(b) applies to the misappropriation of material nonpublic information for securi-
ties trading purposes in breach of a fiduciary duty or relationship of trust and confidence
that the violator owed to the source of the information); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)
(holding that unlawful tipping occurs under § 10(b) when the tipper breaches his or her
fiduciary duty by conveying the information to the recipient and that such breach is pre-
mised on the tipper communicating the material nonpublic information for his or her fi-
nancial benefit or to provide a gift to the recipient and that the tippee knew or should have
known of such breach). For further discussion, see generally MARC I. STEINBERG & WIL-
LIAM K.S. WANG, INSIDER TRADING (3d ed. Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
74. This author is one such critic. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of
Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 489 (1995).
75. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 375 n. 35 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating
that “a director’s common law liability for trading on inside information has been largely
mooted by the advent of a federal cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”); STEIN-
BERG, supra note 61, at 123–25.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2017). See Exchange Act Release No. 17120, 20 SEC
Docket 1350 (Sept. 4, 1980). Rule 14e-3 was adopted pursuant to the authority granted to
the SEC by Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
77. Generally, a tender offer may be defined as:
A means frequently used to acquire control of a corporation characterized by
active solicitation to purchase a substantial percentage of the target’s stock
from the target’s shareholders at a premium over the market price, offered
for a limited period of time and that may be contingent upon the tender of a
specific number of shares.
MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 500 (7th ed. 2018).
78. Hence, with certain exceptions, Rule 14e-3 prohibits:
[I]nsider and tippee trading in the tender offer context by applying the dis-
close-or-abstain provision where an individual is in possession of material
information relating to a tender offer when he/she knows or has reason to
know that such information is nonpublic and was obtained directly or indi-
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ary duty element, and thus far, its validity has been upheld by the federal
courts.79 Hence, harkening back to the days of yesteryear—namely, its
glorious triumph in TGS—the SEC reinvigorated the insider trading pro-
hibition to the maximum degree feasible in the tender offer setting—per-
haps the foremost setting in which huge insider trading profits are
generated.80
Indeed, another significant contribution that Texas Gulf Sulphur has
made to the law of insider trading is its widespread acceptance in devel-
oped securities markets outside of the United States. For example, to
some degree, the parity of information standard has been adopted by the
European Union.81 Likewise, Australia adheres to the parity of informa-
rectly from the offeror, the subject corporation, any of their affiliated per-
sons, or any person acting on behalf of either company.
Id. at 520.
79. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672–73 (1997) (upholding Rule
14e-3 as applied to facts of case).
80. See generally Fair to All People: The SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading,
Power of SEC Resilience, Rule 14e-3 and the Misappropriation Theory, SEC HISTORICAL
SOCIETY (2006), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/resilience_a.php [https://
perma.cc/P6T6-52GV]; STEINBERG, supra note 61, at 115–17.
81. See Council Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014, supra note 23, at arts. 7, 8, 10, 14, 17
(setting forth, inter alia, insider trading and tipper-tippee prohibitions as well as disclosure
obligations). Article 8 (Insider Dealing) of that Regulation provides:
1.  For the purposes of this Regulation, insider dealing arises where a person
possesses inside information and uses that information by acquiring or dis-
posing of, for its own account or for the account of a third party, directly or
indirectly, financial instruments to which that information relates . . . .
2.  For the purposes of this Regulation, recommending that another person
engage in insider dealing, or inducing another person to engage in insider
dealing, arises where the person possesses inside information and:
(a)  recommends, on the basis of that information, that another person
acquire or dispose of financial instruments to which that information re-
lates, or induces that person to make such an acquisition or disposal, or
(b)  recommends, on the basis of that information, that another person
cancel or amend an order concerning a financial instrument to which that
information relates, or induces that person to make such a cancellation or
amendment.
3.  The use of the recommendations or inducements referred to in paragraph
2 amounts to insider dealing within the meaning of this Article where the
person using the recommendation or inducement knows or ought to know
that it is based upon inside information.
4.  This Article applies to any person who possesses inside information as a
result of:
(a)  being a member of the administrative, management or supervisory
bodies of the issuer or emission allowance market participant;
(b)  having a holding in the capital of the issuer or emission allowance
market participant;
(c)  having access to the information through the exercise of an employ-
ment, profession or duties; or
(d)  being involved in criminal activities.
This Article also applies to any person who possesses inside information
under circumstances other than those referred to in the first subparagraph
where that person knows or ought to know that it is inside information.
5.   Where the person is a legal person, this Article shall also apply, in accor-
dance with national law, to the natural persons who participate in the deci-
sion to carry out the acquisition, disposal, cancellation or amendment of an
order for the account of the legal person concerned.
640 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
tion approach.82 By comparison, the access test has been adopted by such
jurisdictions as Canada (Ontario)83 and China.84 Not surprisingly, the re-
strictive and vague “fiduciary duty” approach adopted by the U.S. Su-
preme Court has not been accepted outside of this country.85 Although
one cannot state with assurance the extent that TGS has impacted the
adoption of insider trading standards abroad, it is reasonable to conclude
that, in view of that decision’s prominence, it has served as a persuasive
source for effecting such implementation.
III. A TRULY SEMINAL DECISION
Texas Gulf Sulphur truly is a seminal decision. Its analysis and holdings
continue to be pertinent today in this country and abroad. The presence
of a continuous disclosure framework, with the attendant application of a
flexible materiality standard, is firmly established in this country and
other developed securities markets. The proscription against improper in-
sider trading in the impersonal stock exchange market setting is within
the purview of U.S. federal law—largely due to TGS and the widespread
acceptance following that decision of such federalization. Although the
Supreme Court rejected both the parity of information and access stan-
dards under § 10(b), the Court clearly recognized the propriety of such
federalization.
Indeed, the SEC’s embracement of the parity of information approach
under Rule 14e-3, as well as the acceptance of the TGS standards by
countries abroad, evidence the continued vitality of this decision. Hence,
it may well be accurate to identify the Second Circuit’s en banc decision
Id. at art. 8. See also Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 16
April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, art. 3, para. 3, 2014 O.J. (L 173)
179–89 (providing, inter alia, that a person engages in improper insider dealing when one
has access to material nonpublic information by means of one’s profession, employment, or
duties or otherwise “has obtained [such] inside information under [other] circumstances
where that person knows that it is inside information”); id., at art. 3, para. 1–8, art. 4, para.
1–5. See generally MARKET ABUSE REGULATION—COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED
GUIDE (Marco Ventoruzzo & Sebastian Mock eds. Oxford Univ. Press 2017).
82. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) § 1043A (Austl.) (setting forth prohibited con-
duct for person in possession of material inside information).
83. See Province of Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c S. 5, § 76 (Can.). See also,
note 55 supra.
84. See  [Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China
(2014 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29,
1998, rev’d Aug. 31, 2014, effective Aug. 31, 2014) art. 76 (China).
85. This lack of acceptance of U.S. Supreme Court standards in the insider trading
context by countries abroad is addressed in a number of my other publications. See, e.g.,
MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW—A CONTEMPORARY AND COM-
PARATIVE ANALYSIS 105–48 (Kluwer Law Int’l 1999); Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading
Regulation—A Comparative Analysis, 37 INT’L LAW. 153, 162–71 (2003). As stated by this
author:
U.S. regulation of insider trading is far from perfect. Without sufficient justi-
fication, ambiguity, complexity, and disparate treatment of similarly situated
market participants, at times, prevail. Perhaps cognizant of these shortcom-
ings, nations with developed securities markets have declined to follow U.S.
standards in the insider trading context . . . .
37 INT’L LAW at 171.
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in Texas Gulf Sulphur as the most important judicial decision in the his-
tory of the U.S. securities laws. Although it has certainly incurred some
“hits” to its armor, TGS reigns supreme. Accordingly, it is fitting that we
commemorate the 50th year anniversary of this seminal decision by the
publication of this Symposium Issue. I thank the SMU Law Review and
the esteemed academicians who have contributed to this Issue for bring-
ing this worthwhile endeavor to fruition.
